We may distinguish between the general faculty of will as a property of mind, and the particular volitions or acts of the will, just as we distinguish between gravitation and its specific acts, say in moving some particle of matter. The particular volitions have all a cause, but the main part of the cause is to be found in the faculty of will, and in the nature of the will. We maintain that these volitions are not determined by mere sensations from without, as the philosophers of the French sensational school and the followers of Eobert Owen assert, nor by the last act of the judgment, nor by emotions within the mind, as the higher order of British and American Necessarians seem to assert, but by the very nature of the will itself as an independent self-acting faculty. In this high and important sense, the will may be said to possess a self-determining power, that is, a power of determining its own volitions.*

All this seems to be revealed by the consciousness, and is not to be set aside by logical ingenuities, and the starting of sophistical difficulties, derived from the operation of mere physical nature, or the exercise of the other faculties of the human mind, which differ from the will just as the will differs from them. It is true that this analysis, as we shall immediately see, removes the great question discussed between the Necessarians and Libertarians but a stage farther back. But there is this great advantage in removing the question thus far back, that we leave in front of it, and untouched by it, the faculty of will, a faculty of a most peculiar kind, a faculty constrained by nothing out of itself, but following its own free and independent laws. There

operates to produce a particular act. of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone or of many together." (Freedom of the Will, p. 1, s. 2.) In asserting that the will is swayed by motives as thus defined, we are affirming nothing to the point. It is said that the will is swayed by the motive; and when we ask what the motive is, it is answered, All that sways the will. Ve are making

no progress ; we are swinging upon a hinge, in advancing and reaclvancing such maxims. The motive should be divided into two parts, that which is without the will, and that which is within the will; the latter of these being, we maintain, the main element. Sir W. Hamilton has been so kind as direct the author's attention to the definition by Leibnitz, in one of his letters to Clarke. ** The motives comprehend all the dispositions which the mind can have to act voluntarily; for they include not only the reasons, but also the inclinations, arising from the passions or other preceding impressions," (see extract at length in Hamilton's Beid, footnotes, pp. 610, 611.)

* See OPERATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IN THEHUMAS MIXD, in APPENDIX Yli